Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

What Is, and What Is In Itself: A Systematic Ontology [Kietas viršelis]

3.33/5 (6 ratings by Goodreads)
(Clark Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Yale University)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 240 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 241x160x16 mm, weight: 486 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 30-Dec-2021
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0192856138
  • ISBN-13: 9780192856135
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
What Is, and What Is In Itself: A Systematic OntologyDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 240 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 241x160x16 mm, weight: 486 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 30-Dec-2021
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0192856138
  • ISBN-13: 9780192856135
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9780192856135.html
Raktažodžiai:
This work is ''a systematic ontology.'' Ontology is the study of being as such, and a systematic ontology is an account of the most fundamental ways of being something or other - of what they are and of how they are related to each other. The questions it pursues are not primarily about what
causes things, but about what things are or consist in - though causal questions cannot be totally avoided. The title of the work, What Is, and What Is in Itself, marks the most important distinction in ways of being. What is includes everything there is, but not everything there is included in what
is in itself. The first five chapters of the book define and examine the ways of being: in chapters 1 and 2, being actual or existing, or even just being something without existing or being actual; in chapter 3, being an intentional object, and perhaps a merely intentional object; in chapter 4,
relations between things and their properties; and in chapter 5, being a thing in itself. Chapter 6 discusses whether only conscious beings are things in themselves, and suggests an affirmative answer. Chapter 7 discusses the epistemology of ontology. Chapters 8 and 9 discuss issues about thisness
and identity. And chapters 10 and 11 discuss mainly occasionalist and panentheist answers to questions about the causal unity of the universe.

Recenzijos

In this volume, Adams (emer., Yale Univ.) puts forth a very intense contribution to analytic metaphysics that is in dialogue with contemporary thinkers such as Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, and Willard Van Orman Quine, and important early modern philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz, and Malebranche.While the text is certainly dense and meant for higher-level students and scholars, it gives a skillful and necessary summary and analysis of modern metaphysical thought up to the present. * J. Sienkiewicz, CHOICE *

Acknowledgments xi
Introduction and Overview 1(6)
1 Actuality
7(16)
1.1 What Is Actualism?
8(2)
1.2 The Indexical Theory of Actuality
10(3)
1.3 Critique of the Indexical Theory
13(6)
1.4 Actualism and Possible Worlds
19(4)
2 Existence
23(15)
2.1 Existence and Essence
23(7)
2.2 Continuing or Ceasing to Exist
30(2)
2.3 Things There Are That Never Exist
32(6)
3 Intentional Objects, Existent and Nonexistent
38(18)
3.1 What Are Intentional Objects?
39(4)
3.2 Extreme Realism about Nonexistent Objects
43(5)
3.3 Moderate Realism about Nonexistent Objects
48(3)
3.4 Anti-Realism about Nonexistent Objects
51(5)
4 Things and Properties
56(20)
4.1 Reification
56(2)
4.2 What Does Quantification Require?
58(6)
4.2.1 Entity without Identity?
60(2)
4.2.2 Identity without Entity?
62(2)
4.3 Subjects and Properties
64(12)
4.3.1 Properties
66(2)
4.3.2 Properties as Universals and as Particulars
68(2)
4.3.3 Ontological Subjects
70(4)
4.3.4 Substance?
74(2)
5 Intrinsic Reality, Relationality, and Consciousness
76(18)
5.1 Real Properties
76(3)
5.2 Intrinsic Reality
79(2)
5.3 Consciousness: Our Surest Example of Intrinsic Reality
81(2)
5.4 Intrinsic Reality and Mental Acts
83(4)
5.4.1 Understanding and Judgment
83(3)
5.4.2 Intending and Trying
86(1)
5.5 Intrinsic Reality and Relations
87(7)
5.5.1 Part-Whole Relations
88(2)
5.5.2 Relations of Cause and Effect
90(2)
5.5.3 Potentialities
92(2)
6 Reality and the Physical
94(24)
6.1 Modernism
95(7)
6.2 Physical Realism
102(3)
6.3 Idealism
105(6)
6.4 Panpsychism
111(7)
6.4.1 Panpsychism Proposed as a Solution for Two Problems
111(2)
6.4.2 Physicalism and the Combination Problem
113(2)
6.4.3 Panpsychism without the Combination Problem
115(1)
6.4.4 Conclusion
116(2)
7 The Epistemology of Being
118(15)
7.1 Problems for Empiricist Epistemology
118(1)
7.2 Leibniz on Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena
119(4)
7.3 An Empirical Sufficient Condition for Knowledge of Bodies
123(2)
7.4 The Modal Status of the Sufficient Condition
125(5)
7.4.1 Actuality and Incompleteness
126(1)
7.4.2 The Nature of the Sufficiency
126(4)
7.5 Practical Reason and Ontological Belief
130(3)
8 Thisness
133(25)
8.1 Thisness and Suchness
133(3)
8.2 Issues about the Identity of Indiscernibles
136(4)
8.3 Counter-examples and Intuitions
140(4)
8.4 Thisness and Intrinsic Reality
144(5)
8.4.1 Thisness and Things in Themselves
144(3)
8.4.2 Thisness and Things That Are Not Things in Themselves
147(2)
8.5 The World and I: Thisness in Empirical Epistemology
149(9)
9 Identity, Time, and Self
158(19)
9.1 Identity without Distance
158(2)
9.2 Experience and Time
160(2)
9.3 Identity, Persons, and Metaphysics
162(6)
9.4 Life after Death
168(6)
9.4.1 A Toy Model
169(2)
9.4.2 The Body
171(2)
9.4.3 The Soul
173(1)
9.5 Primitive Trans-World Identity?
174(3)
10 God and the Causal Unity of the World
177(17)
10.1 The Problem of Intrinsically Real Causal Relations
177(3)
10.2 Occasionalism
180(5)
10.2.1 How Does Occasional Causation Work?
180(3)
10.2.2 Deterministic and Indeterministic Occasionalism
183(2)
10.3 Panentheism
185(9)
10.3.1 Is God a Subject of Our Conscious Experiences?
186(1)
10.3.2 Divine Omnisubjectivity
187(3)
10.3.3 Persons, Human and Divine
190(4)
11 God and Possibilities
194(19)
11.1 Can God Know All Possibilities without Actualizing All of Them?
194(11)
11.1.1 Logical Possibilities and Necessities
196(4)
11.1.2 Qualitative Possibilities and Non-Possibilities
200(5)
11.2 Omnisubjectivity and Single-Subject Models of Possible Worlds?
205(3)
11.3 How Much Do Non-Actual Worlds Matter?
208(2)
11.4 Causal Possibilities, Powers, Laws, and God
210(3)
Bibliography 213(8)
Index 221
Robert Merrihew Adams got an AB in philosophy at Princeton University, 1955-59, a BA in theology at Oxford University, 1959-61, and a BD at Princeton Theological Seminary, 1961-62, following which he served as pastor of a Presbyterian church in Montauk at the eastern tip of Long Island, 1962-65. He got his PhD in Philosophy at Cornell University, 1965-69. He then taught Philosophy full time at the University of Michigan, 1968-72, at UCLA 1972-93, and at Yale 1999-2003. He became a non-stipendiary Senior Research Fellow and very part-time Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University 2004-09, and a part-time Professor of Philosophy at UNC Chapel Hill 2009-13 and at Rutgers 2013-16.