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El. knyga: Williamson on Knowledge

Edited by (University of Edinburgh), Edited by (University of St Andrews)
  • Formatas: 411 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Oct-2009
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780191571626
  • Formatas: 411 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Oct-2009
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780191571626

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Timothy Williamson's 2000 book Knowledge and Its Limits is perhaps the most important work of philosophy of the decade. Eighteen leading philosophers have now joined forces to give a critical assessment of ideas and arguments in this work, and the impact it has had on contemporary philosophy. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, skepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.

Recenzijos

the volume is an especially valuable epistemological resource: it ushers us toward a deeper understanding of Williamson's epistemology. Here in a single volume are interesting new criticisms of Williamson's views, leveled by some epistemological heavyweights, and novel defenses of those views, defenses in which Williamson often supplements and further develops his earlier contributions. His pioneering work occupies an important place in epistemology, and this volume is a rich and welcome aid to those of us who have an interest in understanding and appreciating Williamson's work. * Tim Black, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * The volume appears suitable for an audience of (mainly postgraduate) students and scholars of philosophy who are already familiar with Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology but look for clarifications, further explanations, or aim at a critical assessment of it in the light of more recent philosophical reflection. The book turns out to be a very valuable tool with respect to these aims. ... intreguing and valuable. * Luca Moretti, Mind *

Contributors ix
Introduction 1
Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard
1. E = K and Perceptual Knowledge 5
Anthony Brueckner
2. Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed? 12
Quassim Cassam
3. Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against 31
Elizabeth Fricker
4. The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Nature of Testimonial Knowledge 60
Sanford C. Goldberg
5. Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence 73
Alvin Goldman
6. Knowledge and Objective Chance 92
John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
7. Primeness, Internalism, Explanation 109
Frank Jackson
8. Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism 122
Mark Kaplan
9. Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries 140
Jonathan Kvanvig
10. Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility 161
Ram Neta
11. Evidence = Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism 183
Stephen Schiffer
12. Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits 203
Ernest Sosa
13. Are Mental States Luminous? 217
Matthias Steup
14. Cognitive Phenomenology, Semantic Qualia, and Luminous Knowledge 237
Neil Tennant
15. Aristotle's Condition 257
Charles Travis
16. Replies to Critics 279
Timothy Williamson
References 385
Index 393
Patrick Greenough is a senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews. His works in the Philosophy of Logic, the Philosophy of Language, and Epistemology.



Duncan Pritchard gained his PhD from the University of St. Andrews. His research is mainly in epistemology and he has published widely in this area, including Epistemic Luck (OUP, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). Previously, he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling; he presently occupies the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh.