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El. knyga: Failure of Counterinsurgency: Why Hearts and Minds Are Seldom Won

  • Formatas: 200 pages
  • Serija: Praeger Security International
  • Išleidimo metai: 19-Jul-2013
  • Leidėjas: Praeger Publishers Inc
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781440830105
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Failure of Counterinsurgency: Why Hearts and Minds Are Seldom WonDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: 200 pages
  • Serija: Praeger Security International
  • Išleidimo metai: 19-Jul-2013
  • Leidėjas: Praeger Publishers Inc
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781440830105
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This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency warfare for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them.

Given the unsatisfactory outcomes of the counterinsurgency (COIN) wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military is now in a heated debate over whether wars involving COIN operations are worth fighting. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of COIN through key historic episodes and concludes that the answer is an emphatic "no," based on a dominant record of U.S. military or political failure, and inconsistency in the reasons for the rare cases of success. The author also examines the implications of his findings for U.S. foreign policy, defense policy, and future weapons procurement.

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This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency warfare for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them.
1 Introduction: Quagmire: The Usual Outcome of Counterinsurgency Warfare
1(16)
What Is an Insurgency?
2(1)
Guerrillas Have the Advantage in COIN Wars
3(3)
Guerrillas Not Winning the Support of the People Is Rare
6(1)
Governments Disregard History and Continue to Jump into COIN Wars
7(10)
2 When to Battle Insurgents
17(28)
The Different Types of Guerrilla Wars
18(1)
Losing COIN Both Militarily and Politically
19(8)
Winning COIN Militarily, but Losing Politically
27(5)
Losing COIN Militarily, but Winning a Larger Conflict
32(1)
COIN War Ending in Negotiated Settlement or Concessions by COIN Forces
33(2)
Closely Examining the Minority of Cases in which COIN Forces Won Both Militarily and Politically
35(7)
Conclusion
42(3)
3 Classic COIN Strategy
45(12)
Scorched Earth Sometimes Succeeds
46(1)
In the Modern World, a Classical COIN Strategy Is Probably Best
47(2)
But COIN Doesn't Always Work
49(1)
Insurgency More Cost Effective Than Counterinsurgency
50(2)
A Classic COIN Strategy Requires More Forces Than Does Blasting Rebels
52(2)
Conclusion
54(3)
4 COIN and Compromise
57(6)
Successful Episodes Involving Concessions or Compromise
57(3)
Missed Opportunities
60(2)
Conclusion
62(1)
5 The Disadvantage of Foreign Occupiers
63(14)
A Nationalist Reaction Against Foreign Occupation Can Make Revolt Potent
63(1)
Nationalist-Based Insurgencies Are the Most Effective
64(2)
Even Factionalized Nationalist Movements Can Win a Guerrilla War
66(1)
Governments Can Occasionally Hold the Nationalist Card Vis-a-Vis Guerrillas
66(1)
But It Doesn't Always Take Nationalist Movements to Win Guerrilla Wars
67(1)
Guerrillas Have Advantages in Propaganda Use
68(1)
Foreign Occupiers Are Rarely Given the Benefit of the Doubt by Locals
69(1)
And Some Local Guerrillas Can (Literally) Get Away with Murder
70(1)
Foreign Occupiers Are Handicapped by Poor Knowledge of Local Conditions
71(2)
If Foreign Forces Are Used Instead of Training Local Ones, Winning Is Problematical
73(1)
The Advantage of Local Forces Compared to an Outsider
74(1)
Conclusion
75(2)
6 The Guerrilla Advantage
77(8)
Despite Advances in Technology, Guerrillas Retain Advantages
78(2)
Guerrillas May Try to Provoke COIN Forces into an Overreaction
80(3)
Conclusion
83(2)
7 COIN Forces' Advantages: Firepower, Numbers, and Technology
85(18)
COIN Forces' Use of Excessive Firepower Often Backfires
88(3)
Targeted Killings of Guerrilla Leaders May Backfire as a COIN Strategy
91(1)
Scorched Earth Policies Can Sometimes Work
92(1)
Sometimes Even Benevolent Policies Are Not Successful
93(1)
Lack of Political Will Can Be a Problem in COIN
94(1)
Expanding Indigenous Forces to Take Over Can Be Difficult
95(1)
COIN Forces May Develop Tactical Innovations but Still Lose the War
95(4)
Waging COIN Is a Difficult Balancing Act
99(2)
Conclusion
101(2)
8 Time Favors the Insurgents
103(8)
Guerrillas Are Often in No Hurry
103(1)
Some Insurgents Are Still Waiting
104(1)
Trying to Win Too Quickly Can Hurt Insurgents
105(1)
A Key Center of Gravity Is Public Support for the COIN War at Home
106(1)
Foreign COIN Forces Are Challenged Because Their Time Is Likely Fleeting
107(2)
Conclusion
109(2)
9 COIN Wars: The Political Aspects
111(10)
Local Governments Engaged in COIN Likely Already Suffer Legitimacy Problems
113(1)
Military Organizations' Forte Is Not the Armed Social Work Needed for COIN
114(1)
Instituting Democracy Is Often a Facade and Isn't Always a Plus for COIN Warfare
115(2)
The Results of Even Fair Elections Are Not Always Predictable
117(1)
COIN Often Unwisely Tries to Strengthen Local Central Government
117(2)
Conclusion
119(2)
10 The Guerrilla Win and External Support
121(6)
Guerrillas Who Won Militarily or Politically Without External Aid
121(1)
Even Without External Aid Some Rebels Persevere
122(1)
Walls Can Be Effective in Keeping Out Aid and Fighters, But Not Permanently
123(1)
Guerrillas Who Likely Could Have Won Without External Aid
123(1)
Could Losers Win With External Assistance?
124(1)
Assisting the Enemy
124(1)
Conclusion
124(3)
11 The United States and Politically Dominated Wars
127(4)
Politics of Weapons Buying Stops Great Powers from Equipping for COIN
128(2)
Conclusion
130(1)
12 Prospects for Pending COIN Wars
131(20)
U.S. Occupation of Iraq
131(3)
U.S. Occupation of Afghanistan
134(6)
Counterinsurgency From the Air: The Drone Wars in Yemen and Somalia
140(5)
The General War on Terror
145(3)
Conclusion
148(3)
13 U.S. Track Record on COIN: Implications for Forces and Weapons
151(10)
U.S. Vital Interests Do Not Usually Require COIN Warfare
151(4)
What about the Unlikely Scenario of a Necessary COIN War?
155(3)
Conclusion
158(3)
14 The Domestic Effects of Overseas Counterinsurgency Wars
161(11)
Vietnam War
164(2)
The War on Terror
166(6)
Conclusion 172(3)
Bibliography 175(6)
Index 181(8)
About the Author 189
Ivan Eland, PhD, is director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute in Oakland, CA. His published works include Praeger's Putting Defense Back into U.S. Defense Policy: Rethinking U.S. Security in the Post-Cold War World.
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