Preface |
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xiii | |
Author |
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xxi | |
Chapter 1 The 1900s and Onward: Beginnings |
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1 | (22) |
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1 | (1) |
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1.2 Safety and Risk: Divine or Human? |
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2 | (3) |
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1.3 Modernity and Humankind's Control of Nature |
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5 | (1) |
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1.4 Modernity and Safety Engineering |
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6 | (2) |
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1.5 The Rise of Safety Institutions |
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8 | (10) |
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1.5.1 The Politics of Safety |
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8 | (2) |
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1.5.2 Inspectors and Investigators |
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10 | (2) |
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1.5.3 Standards and Professional Associations |
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12 | (1) |
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1.5.4 Insurers, the State, and Workers' Compensation |
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13 | (5) |
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1.6 Safety Science and the Role of the Human |
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18 | (1) |
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18 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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19 | (4) |
Chapter 2 The 1910s and Onward: Taylor and Proceduralization |
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23 | (40) |
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24 | (1) |
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2.2 The Intersection of Science, Management, and Safety |
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24 | (8) |
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2.2.1 Foundations of Procedures and Safety |
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24 | (1) |
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2.2.2 Taylor and Time Studies |
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25 | (2) |
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2.2.3 The Gilbreths and Motion Studies |
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27 | (1) |
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2.2.4 Differences and Similarities between Time and Motion Studies |
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28 | (2) |
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2.2.5 Implications for Safety Science |
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30 | (2) |
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2.3 Procedures, Safety Rules, and "Violations" |
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32 | (11) |
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2.3.1 The Relationship between Safety and Rules |
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32 | (2) |
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2.3.2 Model 1 and the Scientific Management Legacy |
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34 | (3) |
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2.3.3 "Violations" as a Preoccupation of Model 1 |
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37 | (6) |
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2.4 Model 2: Applying Procedures as Substantive Cognitive Activity |
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43 | (9) |
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2.4.1 Procedures and the Complexity of Work |
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43 | (4) |
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2.4.2 Procedures as Resources for Action |
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47 | (3) |
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2.4.3 Work-as-Imagined Versus Work-as-Done |
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50 | (2) |
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52 | (2) |
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2.5.1 The Limits of Prespecified Guidance |
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52 | (1) |
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2.5.2 Failing to Adapt or Adaptations That Fail |
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53 | (1) |
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2.5.3 Closing the Gap or Understanding It? |
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54 | (1) |
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2.6 Scientific Management in Safety Today |
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54 | (4) |
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2.6.1 Workers Are Dumb, Managers Are Smart |
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54 | (2) |
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2.6.2 Taylor and Linear, Closed, Predictable Work |
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56 | (1) |
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2.6.3 Methodological Individualism |
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57 | (1) |
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58 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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59 | (4) |
Chapter 3 The 1920s and Onward: Accident Prone |
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63 | (24) |
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63 | (1) |
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3.2 The Discovery (or Construction) of Accident-Proneness |
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64 | (6) |
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3.2.1 Accident-Prone Workers |
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64 | (1) |
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3.2.2 German Origins of Accident-Proneness |
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65 | (2) |
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3.2.3 English Origins of Accident-Proneness |
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67 | (2) |
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3.2.4 French Origins of Accident-Proneness |
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69 | (1) |
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3.3 The Social Conditions of Possibility |
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70 | (4) |
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3.3.1 Modernization, Measurement, and Statistics |
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70 | (2) |
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3.3.2 Individual Differences and Eugenics |
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72 | (1) |
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3.3.3 Idiots, Imbeciles, and Morons |
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73 | (1) |
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3.4 Accident-Proneness Today |
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74 | (5) |
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3.4.1 The Growth of Dissent |
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74 | (2) |
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3.4.2 Recent Studies of Accident-Proneness |
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76 | (2) |
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3.4.3 Accident-Proneness Versus Systems Thinking |
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78 | (1) |
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3.5 Expertise and Accident-Proneness |
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79 | (4) |
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3.5.1 Are Experts More Accident Prone? |
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79 | (2) |
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3.5.2 Expertise and Organizational Vulnerability to Accidents |
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81 | (2) |
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83 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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83 | (4) |
Chapter 4 The 1930s and Onward: Heinrich and Behavior-Based Safety |
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87 | (50) |
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88 | (1) |
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4.2 A 'Scientific' Examination of Accident Causation |
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89 | (5) |
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89 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Bird and 'Damage Control' |
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90 | (4) |
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4.3 Three Pillars of Heinrich's Theory |
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94 | (5) |
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4.3.1 Injuries Are the Result of Linear, Single Causation |
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94 | (3) |
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4.3.2 The Ratio between Occurrences, Minor Injuries and Major Injuries |
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97 | (1) |
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98 | (1) |
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99 | (13) |
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4.4.1 Behaviorism, Industrialization, and Progress |
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105 | (1) |
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4.4.2 Behaviorism and Industrial Psychology |
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106 | (1) |
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4.4.3 Productivity Measures as Safety Measures |
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107 | (5) |
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112 | (7) |
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4.5.1 Impact across the Decades |
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112 | (4) |
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116 | (3) |
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4.6 Critiques of Heinrich, Behaviorism and BBS |
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119 | (14) |
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4.6.1 The Primacy of 'Human Error' |
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119 | (2) |
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4.6.2 The Triangle (or Pyramid) |
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121 | (10) |
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4.6.3 Chain-Of-Events Thinking and Decomposition Assumptions |
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131 | (2) |
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133 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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134 | (3) |
Chapter 5 The 1940s and Onward: Human Factors and Cognitive Systems Engineering |
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137 | (52) |
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138 | (8) |
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5.1.1 The Place of Human Factors in the 20th Century |
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138 | (1) |
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5.1.2 Human Factors Change Behavior, But Not by Targeting Behavior |
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139 | (1) |
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5.1.3 The Emergence of 'Human Factors' |
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140 | (4) |
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5.1.4 Work Inside and Outside the Research Laboratory |
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144 | (2) |
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5.2 Human Factors and Changes in Psychology |
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146 | (12) |
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5.2.1 Behaviorism: Changing the Legacy |
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146 | (1) |
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5.2.2 The First Cognitive Revolution: Information Processing |
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147 | (5) |
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5.2.3 Losing Situation Awareness |
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152 | (4) |
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5.2.4 The Second Cognitive Revolution |
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156 | (2) |
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5.3 Cognitive Systems Engineering |
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158 | (25) |
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5.3.1 Human Error (Again) |
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158 | (1) |
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5.3.2 Jens Rasmussen's Foundational Work |
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159 | (3) |
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5.3.3 Two Stories of Error |
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162 | (2) |
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5.3.4 Increased Socio-Technological Complexity |
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164 | (2) |
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5.3.5 Joint Cognitive Systems |
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166 | (8) |
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5.3.6 Patterns in Cognitive Systems Engineering |
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174 | (9) |
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183 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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184 | (5) |
Chapter 6 The 1950s, 1960s, and Onward: System Safety |
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189 | (30) |
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189 | (3) |
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6.2 Historical Background |
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192 | (5) |
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192 | (1) |
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6.2.2 Missiles, Nuclear, and Aerospace |
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193 | (3) |
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6.2.3 Complexity, Culture, and Computers |
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196 | (1) |
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6.3 Formal Concepts of System Safety |
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197 | (17) |
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197 | (3) |
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200 | (3) |
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203 | (1) |
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6.3.4 Reliability and Safety |
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204 | (3) |
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6.3.5 System Safety and Understanding Complex System Breakdowns |
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207 | (7) |
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6.4 System Safety as the Absence of Negative Events? |
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214 | (1) |
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215 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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216 | (3) |
Chapter 7 The 1970s and Onward: Man-Made Disasters |
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219 | (48) |
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7.1 Man-Made Disaster Theory |
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219 | (3) |
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7.1.1 Safety and Social Science |
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220 | (1) |
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7.1.2 Disasters Do not Come Out of the Blue |
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221 | (1) |
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7.2 The Incubation Period |
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222 | (23) |
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7.2.1 Stages of Incubation |
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223 | (4) |
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7.2.2 Failures of Foresight |
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227 | (2) |
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7.2.3 The Creation of Local Rationality |
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229 | (4) |
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7.2.4 Studying the 'Information Environment' |
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233 | (6) |
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239 | (1) |
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240 | (3) |
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7.2.7 Addressing the Barriers: Safety Imagination |
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243 | (2) |
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7.3 Models of Drift and Disaster Incubation after Turner |
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245 | (15) |
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7.3.1 Normalization of Deviance |
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247 | (4) |
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7.3.1.1 Continued Belief in Safe Operations |
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248 | (1) |
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7.3.1.2 Goal Interactions and Normalization of Deviance |
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249 | (2) |
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251 | (3) |
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254 | (4) |
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7.3.4 Similarities and Overlap in Drift Models |
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258 | (1) |
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7.3.5 Drift into Failure and Incident Reporting |
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259 | (1) |
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7.4 Man-Made Disaster Theory and Societal Emancipation |
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260 | (2) |
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262 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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263 | (4) |
Chapter 8 The 1980s and Onward: Normal Accidents and High Reliability Organizations |
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267 | (38) |
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8.1 Normal Accident Theory |
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267 | (14) |
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8.1.1 Linear versus Complex Interactions |
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272 | (2) |
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8.1.2 Loose versus Tight Coupling |
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274 | (2) |
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8.1.3 The Paradox of Centralized Decentralization |
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276 | (5) |
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8.2 High Reliability Organizations |
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281 | (9) |
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8.2.1 The Beginnings of HRO: La Porte, Roberts, and Rochlin |
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281 | (4) |
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8.2.2 Weick and Sutcliffe's Concept of Mindfulness |
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285 | (3) |
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8.2.3 HRO and the Capacity for Safe Operations |
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288 | (2) |
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8.3 Sagan and "The Limits of Safety" |
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290 | (6) |
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8.3.1 NAT and HRO in a Historical Case |
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290 | (3) |
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8.3.2 NAT and HRO in Debate |
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293 | (3) |
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8.3.2.1 Competitive versus Complementary Approaches |
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293 | (1) |
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8.3.2.2 Are Accidents Preventable? |
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294 | (1) |
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8.3.2.3 Tightly Coupled and Interactively Complex Systems |
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294 | (1) |
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8.3.2.4 Organizational Structure |
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295 | (1) |
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8.3.2.5 Technology and Human Operators |
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295 | (1) |
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8.3.2.6 Outcome of the Debate |
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296 | (1) |
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296 | (5) |
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8.4.1 Further Development of NAT |
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296 | (2) |
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8.4.2 Further Development of HRO |
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298 | (3) |
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301 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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301 | (4) |
Chapter 9 The 1990s and Onward: Swiss Cheese and Safety Management Systems |
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305 | (34) |
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306 | (2) |
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9.1.1 Thinking about the System Had Been Long in the Making |
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306 | (1) |
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9.1.2 Impossible Accidents |
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307 | (1) |
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308 | (11) |
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9.2.1 Defenses-In-Depth and Barriers |
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308 | (2) |
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9.2.2 The Impetus for Swiss Cheese |
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310 | (1) |
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311 | (3) |
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9.2.4 Porous Layers of System Defenses |
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314 | (3) |
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9.2.5 Shared Assumptions between Reason, Heinrich, and Bird |
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317 | (2) |
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9.3 Linearity, Judgments, and Bureaucratic Order |
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319 | (8) |
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9.3.1 Linearity and Proportionality |
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319 | (5) |
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9.3.2 Judgments Rather than Explanations |
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324 | (1) |
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9.3.3 Administrative Ordering and Safety Bureaucracies |
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325 | (2) |
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9.4 Swiss Cheese and Safety Management Systems |
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327 | (8) |
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9.4.1 Directing Attention Away from the Sharp End Alone |
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327 | (1) |
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9.4.2 Demonstrating That Safety Risks Are Well Managed |
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328 | (2) |
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9.4.3 The Safety of Work, or the Work of Safety? |
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330 | (5) |
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335 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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336 | (3) |
Chapter 10 The 2000s and Onward: Safety Culture |
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339 | (52) |
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10.1 The Origins of Safety Culture |
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340 | (8) |
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10.1.1 Continuing the Trend into the Blunt End |
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340 | (1) |
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341 | (4) |
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10.1.3 Theoretical Origins |
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345 | (2) |
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347 | (1) |
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10.2 Safety Culture Today |
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348 | (15) |
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10.2.1 What Is It Exactly? |
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348 | (3) |
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10.2.2 A Functionalist Approach to Safety Culture |
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351 | (8) |
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10.2.3 An Interpretivist Approach to Safety Culture |
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359 | (4) |
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10.3 Problems and Critique |
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363 | (24) |
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10.3.1 Cultures That Are 'Better' or 'Worse' |
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363 | (3) |
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10.3.2 Consistency and Agreement Versus Conflict and Contradiction |
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366 | (2) |
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10.3.3 Safety Culture and Power |
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368 | (2) |
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10.3.4 Methodological Individualism |
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370 | (2) |
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10.3.5 Is Safety Culture Useful for Regulators or Investigators? |
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372 | (7) |
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10.3.6 Do Safety Culture Assessments Have Predictive Value? |
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379 | (6) |
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10.3.7 Safety Culture Says so Much, It Ends up Saying Very Little |
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385 | (2) |
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387 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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388 | (3) |
Chapter 11 The 2010s and Onward: Resilience Engineering |
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391 | (40) |
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11.1 The Need for Resilience |
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391 | (11) |
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11.1.1 Resilience Engineering as the Assurance of Capacity to Adapt |
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391 | (4) |
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11.1.2 Resilience and Complexity |
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395 | (3) |
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11.1.3 Complex Systems Operate Far from Equilibrium |
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398 | (1) |
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11.1.4 Resilience in Other Fields |
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399 | (3) |
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11.2 Resilience Engineering as a New Discipline in Safety Science |
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402 | (8) |
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11.3 Resilience Ideas of Rasmussen, Woods, and Hollnagel |
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410 | (7) |
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11.3.1 Tracing Resilience Engineering to the Riso Community in the 1980s |
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410 | (3) |
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11.3.2 Woods: The Adaptive Universe |
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413 | (1) |
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11.3.3 Hollnagel: Cornerstones, Functional Resonance, and Trade-Offs |
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414 | (3) |
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11.4 Dimensions of Resilience Engineering |
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417 | (1) |
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11.5 Three Analytical Traps for Resilience Scholars to Avoid |
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418 | (6) |
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11.5.1 The Reductionist Trap |
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418 | (2) |
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420 | (2) |
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11.5.3 The Normative Trap |
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422 | (2) |
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424 | (1) |
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References and Further Reading |
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424 | (7) |
Postscript |
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431 | (6) |
Index |
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437 | |