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El. knyga: Foundations of Safety Science: A Century of Understanding Accidents and Disasters [Taylor & Francis e-book]

(Griffith University, Nathan Campus, Queensland, Australia)
  • Formatas: 446 pages, 12 Tables, black and white; 16 Illustrations, black and white
  • Išleidimo metai: 16-Apr-2019
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781351059794
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  • Taylor & Francis e-book
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Foundations of Safety Science: A Century of Understanding Accidents and DisastersDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: 446 pages, 12 Tables, black and white; 16 Illustrations, black and white
  • Išleidimo metai: 16-Apr-2019
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781351059794
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Taylor & Francis e-booksMore info about Taylor & Francis e-books
Partnerių interneto svetainė: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781351059794
How are today’s ‘hearts and minds’ programs linked to a late-19th century definition of human factors as people’s moral and mental deficits? What do Heinrich’s ‘unsafe acts’ from the 1930’s have in common with the Swiss cheese model of the early 1990’s? Why was the reinvention of human factors in the 1940’s such an important event in the development of safety thinking? What makes many of our current systems so complex and impervious to Tayloristic safety interventions? ‘Foundations of Safety Science’ covers the origins of major schools of safety thinking, and traces the heritage and interlinkages of the ideas that make up safety science today.FeaturesOffers a comprehensive overview of the theoretical foundations of safety science Provides balanced treatment of approaches since the early 20th century, showing interlinkages and cross-connections Includes an overview and key points at the beginning of each chapter and study questions at the end to support teaching use Uses an accessible style, using technical language where necessary Concentrates on the philosophical and historical traditions and assumptions that underlie all safety approaches
Preface xiii
Author xxi
Chapter 1 The 1900s and Onward: Beginnings
1(22)
Drew Rae
Sidney Dekker
1.1 Introduction
1(1)
1.2 Safety and Risk: Divine or Human?
2(3)
1.3 Modernity and Humankind's Control of Nature
5(1)
1.4 Modernity and Safety Engineering
6(2)
1.5 The Rise of Safety Institutions
8(10)
1.5.1 The Politics of Safety
8(2)
1.5.2 Inspectors and Investigators
10(2)
1.5.3 Standards and Professional Associations
12(1)
1.5.4 Insurers, the State, and Workers' Compensation
13(5)
1.6 Safety Science and the Role of the Human
18(1)
Study Questions
18(1)
References and Further Reading
19(4)
Chapter 2 The 1910s and Onward: Taylor and Proceduralization
23(40)
2.1 Introduction
24(1)
2.2 The Intersection of Science, Management, and Safety
24(8)
2.2.1 Foundations of Procedures and Safety
24(1)
2.2.2 Taylor and Time Studies
25(2)
2.2.3 The Gilbreths and Motion Studies
27(1)
2.2.4 Differences and Similarities between Time and Motion Studies
28(2)
2.2.5 Implications for Safety Science
30(2)
2.3 Procedures, Safety Rules, and "Violations"
32(11)
2.3.1 The Relationship between Safety and Rules
32(2)
2.3.2 Model 1 and the Scientific Management Legacy
34(3)
2.3.3 "Violations" as a Preoccupation of Model 1
37(6)
2.4 Model 2: Applying Procedures as Substantive Cognitive Activity
43(9)
2.4.1 Procedures and the Complexity of Work
43(4)
2.4.2 Procedures as Resources for Action
47(3)
2.4.3 Work-as-imagined Versus Work-as-Done
50(2)
2.5 Model 2 and Safety
52(2)
2.5.1 The Limits of Prespecified Guidance
52(1)
2.5.2 Failing to Adapt or Adaptations That Fail
53(1)
2.5.3 Closing the Gap or Understanding It?
54(1)
2.6 Scientific Management in Safety Today
54(4)
2.6.1 Workers Are Dumb, Managers Are Smart
54(2)
2.6.2 Taylor and Linear, Closed, Predictable Work
56(1)
2.6.3 Methodological Individualism
57(1)
Study Questions
58(1)
References and Further Reading
59(4)
Chapter 3 The 1920s and Onward: Accident Prone
63(24)
3.1 Introduction
63(1)
3.2 The Discovery (or Construction) of Accident-Proneness
64(6)
3.2.1 Accident-Prone Workers
64(1)
3.2.2 German Origins of Accident-Proneness
65(2)
3.2.3 English Origins of Accident-Proneness
67(2)
3.2.4 French Origins of Accident-Proneness
69(1)
3.3 The Social Conditions of Possibility
70(4)
3.3.1 Modernization, Measurement, and Statistics
70(2)
3.3.2 Individual Differences and Eugenics
72(1)
3.3.3 Idiots, Imbeciles, and Morons
73(1)
3.4 Accident-Proneness Today
74(5)
3.4.1 The Growth of Dissent
74(2)
3.4.2 Recent Studies of Accident-Proneness
76(2)
3.4.3 Accident-Proneness Versus Systems Thinking
78(1)
3.5 Expertise and Accident-Proneness
79(4)
3.5.1 Are Experts More Accident Prone?
79(2)
3.5.2 Expertise and Organizational Vulnerability to Accidents
81(2)
Study Questions
83(1)
References and Further Reading
83(4)
Chapter 4 The 1930s and Onward: Heinrich and Behavior-Based Safety
87(50)
4.1 Introduction
88(1)
4.2 A `Scientific' Examination of Accident Causation
89(5)
4.2.1 Heinrich's Study
89(1)
4.2.2 Bird and `Damage Control'
90(4)
4.3 Three Pillars of Heinrich's Theory
94(5)
4.3.1 Injuries Are the Result of Linear, Single Causation
94(3)
4.3.2 The Ratio between Occurrences, Minor Injuries and Major Injuries
97(1)
4.3.3 Worker Unsafe Acts
98(1)
4.4 Behaviorism and BBS
99(13)
4.4.1 Behaviorism, Industrialization, and Progress
105(1)
4.4.2 Behaviorism and Industrial Psychology
106(1)
4.4.3 Productivity Measures as Safety Measures
107(5)
4.5 BBS
112(7)
4.5.1 Impact across the Decades
112(4)
4.5.2 Does BBS Work?
116(3)
4.6 Critiques of Heinrich, Behaviorism and BBS
119(14)
4.6.1 The Primacy of `Human Error'
119(2)
4.6.2 The Triangle (or Pyramid)
121(10)
4.6.3 Chain-Of-Events Thinking and Decomposition Assumptions
131(2)
Study Questions
133(1)
References and Further Reading
134(3)
Chapter 5 The 1940s and Onward: Human Factors and Cognitive Systems Engineering
137(52)
5.1 Introduction
138(8)
5.1.1 The Place of Human Factors in the 20th Century
138(1)
5.1.2 Human Factors Change Behavior, But Not by Targeting Behavior
139(1)
5.1.3 The Emergence of `Human Factors'
140(4)
5.1.4 Work Inside and Outside the Research Laboratory
144(2)
5.2 Human Factors and Changes in Psychology
146(12)
5.2.1 Behaviorism: Changing the Legacy
146(1)
5.2.2 The First Cognitive Revolution: Information Processing
147(5)
5.2.3 Losing Situation Awareness
152(4)
5.2.4 The Second Cognitive Revolution
156(2)
5.3 Cognitive Systems Engineering
158(25)
5.3.1 Human Error (Again)
158(1)
5.3.2 Jens Rasmussen's Foundational Work
159(3)
5.3.3 Two Stories of Error
162(2)
5.3.4 Increased Socio-Technological Complexity
164(2)
5.3.5 Joint Cognitive Systems
166(8)
5.3.6 Patterns in Cognitive Systems Engineering
174(9)
Study Questions
183(1)
References and Further Reading
184(5)
Chapter 6 The 1950s, 1960s, and Onward: System Safety
189(30)
Drew Rae
Sidney Dekker
6.1 Introduction
189(3)
6.2 Historical Background
192(5)
6.2.1 Fly-Fix-Fly
192(1)
6.2.2 Missiles, Nuclear, and Aerospace
193(3)
6.2.3 Complexity, Culture, and Computers
196(1)
6.3 Formal Concepts of System Safety
197(17)
6.3.1 Hazards
197(3)
6.3.2 Risk Assessment
200(3)
6.3.3 Safety Cases
203(1)
6.3.4 Reliability and Safety
204(3)
6.3.5 System Safety and Understanding Complex System Breakdowns
207(7)
6.4 System Safety as the Absence of Negative Events?
214(1)
Study Questions
215(1)
References and Further Reading
216(3)
Chapter 7 The 1970s and Onward: Man-Made Disasters
219(48)
7.1 Man-Made Disaster Theory
219(3)
7.1.1 Safety and Social Science
220(1)
7.1.2 Disasters Do not Come Out of the Blue
221(1)
7.2 The Incubation Period
222(23)
7.2.1 Stages of Incubation
223(4)
7.2.2 Failures of Foresight
227(2)
7.2.3 The Creation of Local Rationality
229(4)
7.2.4 Studying the `Information Environment'
233(6)
7.2.5 Data Overload
239(1)
7.2.6 Groupthink
240(3)
7.2.7 Addressing the Barriers: Safety Imagination
243(2)
7.3 Models of Drift and Disaster Incubation after Turner
245(15)
7.3.1 Normalization of Deviance
247(1)
7.3.1.1 Continued Belief in Safe Operations
248(1)
7.3.1.2 Goal Interactions and Normalization of Deviance
249(2)
7.3.2 Practical Drift
251(3)
7.3.3 Drift into Failure
254(4)
7.3.4 Similarities and Overlap in Drift Models
258(1)
7.3.5 Drift into Failure and Incident Reporting
259(1)
7.4 Man-Made Disaster Theory and Societal Emancipation
260(2)
Study Questions
262(1)
References and Further Reading
263(4)
Chapter 8 The 1980s and Onward: Normal Accidents and High Reliability Organizations
267(38)
Verena Schochlow
Sidney Dekker
8.1 Normal Accident Theory
267(14)
8.1.1 Linear versus Complex Interactions
272(2)
8.1.2 Loose versus Tight Coupling
274(2)
8.1.3 The Paradox of Centralized Decentralization
276(5)
8.2 High Reliability Organizations
281(9)
8.2.1 The Beginnings of HRO: La Porte, Roberts, and Rochlin
281(4)
8.2.2 Weick and Sutcliffe's Concept of Mindfulness
285(3)
8.2.3 HRO and the Capacity for Safe Operations
288(2)
8.3 Sagan and "The Limits of Safety"
290(6)
8.3.1 NAT and HRO in a Historical Case
290(3)
8.3.2 NAT and HRO in Debate
293(1)
8.3.2.1 Competitive versus Complementary Approaches
293(1)
8.3.2.2 Are Accidents Preventable?
294(1)
8.3.2.3 Tightly Coupled and Interactively Complex Systems
294(1)
8.3.2.4 Organizational Structure
295(1)
8.3.2.5 Technology and Human Operators
295(1)
8.3.2.6 Outcome of the Debate
296(1)
8.4 Further Development
296(5)
8.4.1 Further Development of NAT
296(2)
8.4.2 Further Development of HRO
298(3)
Study Questions
301(1)
References and Further Reading
301(4)
Chapter 9 The 1990s and Onward: Swiss Cheese and Safety Management Systems
305(34)
9.1 Introduction
306(2)
9.1.1 Thinking about the System Had Been Long in the Making
306(1)
9.1.2 Impossible Accidents
307(1)
9.2 Swiss Cheese
308(11)
9.2.1 Defenses-In-Depth and Barriers
308(2)
9.2.2 The Impetus for Swiss Cheese
310(1)
9.2.3 Resident Pathogens
311(3)
9.2.4 Porous Layers of System Defenses
314(3)
9.2.5 Shared Assumptions between Reason, Heinrich, and Bird
317(2)
9.3 Linearity, Judgments, and Bureaucratic Order
319(8)
9.3.1 Linearity and Proportionality
319(5)
9.3.2 Judgments Rather than Explanations
324(1)
9.3.3 Administrative Ordering and Safety Bureaucracies
325(2)
9.4 Swiss Cheese and Safety Management Systems
327(8)
9.4.1 Directing Attention Away from the Sharp End Alone
327(1)
9.4.2 Demonstrating That Safety Risks Are Well Managed
328(2)
9.4.3 The Safety of Work, or the Work of Safety?
330(5)
Study Questions
335(1)
References and Further Reading
336(3)
Chapter 10 The 2000s and Onward: Safety Culture
339(52)
10.1 The Origins of Safety Culture
340(8)
10.1.1 Continuing the Trend into the Blunt End
340(1)
10.1.2 Political Origins
341(4)
10.1.3 Theoretical Origins
345(2)
10.1.4 Safety Climate
347(1)
10.2 Safety Culture Today
348(15)
10.2.1 What Is It Exactly?
348(3)
10.2.2 A Functionalist Approach to Safety Culture
351(8)
10.2.3 An Interpretivist Approach to Safety Culture
359(4)
10.3 Problems and Critique
363(24)
10.3.1 Cultures That Are `Better' or `Worse'
363(3)
10.3.2 Consistency and Agreement Versus Conflict and Contradiction
366(2)
10.3.3 Safety Culture and Power
368(2)
10.3.4 Methodological Individualism
370(2)
10.3.5 Is Safety Culture Useful for Regulators or Investigators?
372(7)
10.3.6 Do Safety Culture Assessments Have Predictive Value?
379(6)
10.3.7 Safety Culture Says so Much, It Ends up Saying Very Little
385(2)
Study Questions
387(1)
References and Further Reading
388(3)
Chapter 11 The 2010s and Onward: Resilience Engineering
391(33)
Johan Bergstrom
Sidney Dekker
11.1 The Need for Resilience
391(11)
11.1.1 Resilience Engineering as the Assurance of Capacity to Adapt
391(4)
11.1.2 Resilience and Complexity
395(3)
11.1.3 Complex Systems Operate Far from Equilibrium
398(1)
11.1.4 Resilience in Other Fields
399(3)
11.2 Resilience Engineering as a New Discipline in Safety Science
402(8)
11.3 Resilience Ideas of Rasmussen, Woods, and Hollnagel
410(7)
11.3.1 Tracing Resilience Engineering to the Risø Community in the 1980s
410(3)
11.3.2 Woods: The Adaptive Universe
413(1)
11.3.3 Hollnagel: Cornerstones, Functional Resonance, and Trade-Offs
414(3)
11.4 Dimensions of Resilience Engineering
417(1)
11.5 Three Analytical Traps for Resilience Scholars to Avoid
418(6)
11.5.1 The Reductionist Trap
418(2)
11.5.2 The Moral Trap
420(2)
11.5.3 The Normative Trap
422(2)
Study Questions 424(1)
References and Further Reading 424(7)
Postscript 431(6)
Index 437
Sidney Dekker (PhD Ohio State University, USA, 1996) is professor of social science at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia, where he runs the Safety Science Innovation Lab. He is also Professor (Hon.) of psychology at The University of Queensland, and Professor (Hon.) of human factors and patient safety at Lady Cilento Childrens Hospital in Brisbane. Previously, he was Professor of human factors and system safety at Lund University in Sweden. After becoming full professor, he learned to fly the Boeing 737, and worked part-time as an airline pilot out of Copenhagen. He is author of, most recently: The End of Heaven: Disaster and Suffering in a Scientific Age (2017); Just Culture: Restoring Trust and Accountability in Your Organization (2016); Safety Differently (2015); The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error (2014); Second Victim (2013); Drift into Failure (2011); Patient Safety (2011). More at sidneydekker.com
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