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Mechanisms and Consciousness: Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science [Kietas viršelis]

3.00/5 (1 ratings by Goodreads)
(University of Warsaw, Poland)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 206 pages, aukštis x plotis: 229x152 mm, weight: 412 g, 8 Halftones, black and white; 8 Illustrations, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Research in Phenomenology
  • Išleidimo metai: 30-Nov-2021
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367465256
  • ISBN-13: 9780367465254
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Mechanisms and Consciousness: Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive ScienceDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 206 pages, aukštis x plotis: 229x152 mm, weight: 412 g, 8 Halftones, black and white; 8 Illustrations, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Research in Phenomenology
  • Išleidimo metai: 30-Nov-2021
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367465256
  • ISBN-13: 9780367465254
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9780367465254.html
Raktažodžiai:
"This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes a mechanistic model that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness. While mechanistic models of explanation arewidely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a novel reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops a neurophenomenological approach todynamic modeling of experience. He shows that it can deliver a dynamic model of a target phenomenon, in this case a model of subjective experience, and inform the search for an underlying mechanism. Mechanisms and Consciousness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences"--

This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes a mechanistic model that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.

Recenzijos

"Mechanisms and Consciousness expresses a new voice in the naturalizing phenomenology debate. Marek Pokropski proposes to rethink the issues involved in naturalization in the context of recent discussions about explanatory integration in the cognitive sciences. He provides a lucid overview of the relevant explanatory models, and he articulates a fresh and thought-provoking look at Husserlian phenomenology, bridging it with the seemingly opposite, neomechanistic approach. I recommend this book for those who are intrigued about how to integrate the first-person study of consciousness with cognitive neuroscience."

Shaun Gallagher, Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Philosophy, University of Memphis, USA

"Marek Pokropski's book is an excellent contribution to the discussion on mechanistic explanation. By bringing naturalized phenomenology under the mechanistic umbrella, Pokropski offers a highly compelling view on how naturalized phenomenology may proceed further in the study of consciousness. For all serious students of consciousness and phenomenology, this book is a must-read."

Marcin Mikowski, Polish Academy of Sciences

"As Pokropski rightly notes, work on naturalizing phenomenology is often couched in terms of 20th Century conceptions of scientific explanation and integration, ignoring the growing popularity of mechanistic accounts in recent years. Pokropskis book should change that for the better. Anyone seeking to integrate phenomenology with cognitive science will benefit from reading it."

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"Marek Pokropskis book is a valuable and honest voice in the still heated discussion on the relationship of phenomenology and cognitive sciences. What distinguishes the presented position is, above all, the original, mechanistic-based, integrative perspective, which assumes, first of all, the cooperation of researchers working in various paradigms."

Micha Piekarski, Philosophical Psychology

"Pokropski shows a strong familiarity with an impressive range of topics across different traditions and disciplines. Readers unfamiliar with work at the intersection of phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience, or with work on mechanistic explanation in the mind sciences, would benefit from a great deal of the text. Overall, Pokropskis work makes a contribution to the ongoing dialogue between phenomenological philosophy and the empirical sciences of the mind. Readers sympathetic with the (neo)mechanistic approach to cognition will find a number of places in which that approach is brought into fruitful engagement with topics from Husserls work."

Michael Madary, Husserl Studies

"This is an excellent work which makes an innovative and fruitful contribution to the literature. What is novel about the book is its detailed consideration of a topic that has garnered much attention in cognitive science and analytic philosophy over the last 70 years, but which remains (comparatively) understudied in the phenomenological movement: explanation."

Heath Williams, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

List of Figures
x
Acknowledgments xi
Epigraphs xii
Introduction 1(10)
PART I Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science
11(126)
1 The Concept of Phenomenology
13(29)
1.1 Introduction
13(1)
1.2 What Is Phenomenology
14(9)
1.2.1 Reduction and Variation as Phenomenological Methods
14(4)
1.2.2 Intentionality
18(1)
1.2.3 Static and Genetic Approaches
19(1)
1.2.4 Phenomenological Psychology
20(3)
1.3 What Phenomenology Is Not
23(8)
1.3.1 Phenomenology Is Not Introspection
24(2)
1.3.2 Phenomenology Is Not About Qualia
26(2)
1.3.3 Phenomenology Is Not Anti-Naturalistic
28(3)
1.4 Why We Need Phenomenology in Explaining Consciousness
31(5)
1.5 Conclusion
36(1)
Notes
37(1)
References
37(5)
2 Naturalizing Phenomenology Reconsidered
42(30)
2.1 Introduction
42(2)
2.2 Three Views on the Naturalization of Phenomenology
44(5)
2.3 Mathematization
49(3)
2.4 A Question of Constraints
52(14)
2.4.1 Conceptual Constraints
52(5)
2.4.2 Isomorphism
57(3)
2.4.3 Neurophenomenology and Generative Passages
60(3)
2.4.4 Neurophenomenology and Homeomorphism
63(3)
2.5 Conclusion
66(1)
Notes
67(1)
References
67(5)
3 Models of Explanation in Cognitive Science
72(65)
3.1 Introduction
72(1)
3.2 Scientific Explanation---Background
73(2)
3.3 Models of Explanation in Cognitive Science
75(35)
3.3.1 Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation
75(3)
3.3.2 Personal Explanations
78(5)
3.3.3 Functional Explanations
83(4)
3.3.4 Dynamical Explanations
87(7)
3.3.5 Mechanistic Explanations
94(16)
3.4 Explanatory Integration of Cognitive Science
110(8)
3.4.1 Theoretical Reduction, Unification, and Integration
111(3)
3.4.2 Mechanistic Integration of Cognitive Science
114(2)
3.4.3 Autonomy
116(2)
3.5 Is Phenomenology Explanatory?
118(9)
3.5.1 Types of Phenomenological Explanation
119(5)
3.5.2 Phenomenological Understanding
124(3)
3.6 Conclusion: Toward Integration of Phenomenology With Multilevel Mechanistic Explanation
127(2)
Notes
129(1)
References
129(8)
PART II Phenomenology and Mechanism: In Search of Constraints
137(64)
4 Phenomenology and Functionalism
139(28)
4.1 Introduction
139(1)
4.2 Husserlian Phenomenology and Computational Functionalism
140(5)
4.3 The Notion of Function and the Idea of Functional Phenomenology in Husserl
145(3)
4.4 Functional Analysis and Phenomenological Decomposition
148(5)
4.4.1 Phenomenological Decomposition
150(3)
4.5 Toward Functional-Mechanistic Naturalization
153(9)
4.5.1 Example 1: First-Person Perspective
156(2)
4.5.2 Example 2: Vision Studies
158(4)
4.6 Conclusion
162(1)
Notes
163(1)
References
163(4)
5 Phenomenology and Dynamical Modeling
167(26)
5.1 Introduction
167(1)
5.2 Integrating the Dynamical and Mechanistic Frameworks
167(4)
5.3 Neurophenomenology and Dynamical Systems Theory
171(3)
5.4 Discovering the Dynamics of Experience---Epilepsy Study
174(6)
5.5 Micro-Phenomenology---Toward Diachronic Models of Experience
180(4)
5.6 Conclusion: Toward Phenomenologically Informed Dynamical Constraints
184(4)
Notes
188(1)
References
188(5)
6 Conclusion: Toward Methodologically Guided Mutual Constraints
193(8)
6.1 Constraining Phenomenology
195(4)
References
199(2)
Index 201
Marek Pokropski is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland.