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El. knyga: Mechanisms and Consciousness: Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science [Taylor & Francis e-book]

Marek Pokropski (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Formatas: 206 pages, 8 Halftones, black and white; 8 Illustrations, black and white
Serija: Routledge Research in Phenomenology
Išleidimo metai: 30-Nov-2021
Leidėjas: Routledge
ISBN-13: 9781003035367

Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:

Taylor & Francis e-book
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Formatas: 206 pages, 8 Halftones, black and white; 8 Illustrations, black and white
Serija: Routledge Research in Phenomenology
Išleidimo metai: 30-Nov-2021
Leidėjas: Routledge
ISBN-13: 9781003035367

Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:

More info about Taylor & Francis e-books

Partnerių interneto svetainė: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003035367

"This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes a mechanistic model that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness. While mechanistic models of explanation arewidely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a novel reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops a neurophenomenological approach todynamic modeling of experience. He shows that it can deliver a dynamic model of a target phenomenon, in this case a model of subjective experience, and inform the search for an underlying mechanism. Mechanisms and Consciousness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences"--

This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes a mechanistic model that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.

List of Figures

Acknowledgments

Epigraphs

xii

Introduction

(10)

PART I Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science

(126)

1 The Concept of Phenomenology

(29)

1.1 Introduction

(1)

1.2 What Is Phenomenology

(9)

1.2.1 Reduction and Variation as Phenomenological Methods

(4)

1.2.2 Intentionality

(1)

1.2.3 Static and Genetic Approaches

(1)

1.2.4 Phenomenological Psychology

(3)

1.3 What Phenomenology Is Not

(8)

1.3.1 Phenomenology Is Not Introspection

(2)

1.3.2 Phenomenology Is Not About Qualia

(2)

1.3.3 Phenomenology Is Not Anti-Naturalistic

(3)

1.4 Why We Need Phenomenology in Explaining Consciousness

(5)

1.5 Conclusion

(1)

Notes

(1)

References

(5)

2 Naturalizing Phenomenology Reconsidered

(30)

2.1 Introduction

(2)

2.2 Three Views on the Naturalization of Phenomenology

(5)

2.3 Mathematization

(3)

2.4 A Question of Constraints

(14)

2.4.1 Conceptual Constraints

(5)

2.4.2 Isomorphism

(3)

2.4.3 Neurophenomenology and Generative Passages

(3)

2.4.4 Neurophenomenology and Homeomorphism

(3)

2.5 Conclusion

(1)

Notes

(1)

References

(5)

3 Models of Explanation in Cognitive Science

(65)

3.1 Introduction

(1)

3.2 Scientific Explanation---Background

(2)

3.3 Models of Explanation in Cognitive Science

(35)

3.3.1 Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation

(3)

3.3.2 Personal Explanations

(5)

3.3.3 Functional Explanations

(4)

3.3.4 Dynamical Explanations

(7)

3.3.5 Mechanistic Explanations

(16)

3.4 Explanatory Integration of Cognitive Science

110

(8)

3.4.1 Theoretical Reduction, Unification, and Integration

111

(3)

3.4.2 Mechanistic Integration of Cognitive Science

114

(2)

3.4.3 Autonomy

116

(2)

3.5 Is Phenomenology Explanatory?

118

(9)

3.5.1 Types of Phenomenological Explanation

119

(5)

3.5.2 Phenomenological Understanding

124

(3)

3.6 Conclusion: Toward Integration of Phenomenology With Multilevel Mechanistic Explanation

127

(2)

Notes

129

(1)

References

129

(8)

PART II Phenomenology and Mechanism: In Search of Constraints

137

(64)

4 Phenomenology and Functionalism

139

(28)

4.1 Introduction

139

(1)

4.2 Husserlian Phenomenology and Computational Functionalism

140

(5)

4.3 The Notion of Function and the Idea of Functional Phenomenology in Husserl

145

(3)

4.4 Functional Analysis and Phenomenological Decomposition

148

(5)

4.4.1 Phenomenological Decomposition

150

(3)

4.5 Toward Functional-Mechanistic Naturalization

153

(9)

4.5.1 Example 1: First-Person Perspective

156

(2)

4.5.2 Example 2: Vision Studies

158

(4)

4.6 Conclusion

162

(1)

Notes

163

(1)

References

163

(4)

5 Phenomenology and Dynamical Modeling

167

(26)

5.1 Introduction

167

(1)

5.2 Integrating the Dynamical and Mechanistic Frameworks

167

(4)

5.3 Neurophenomenology and Dynamical Systems Theory

171

(3)

5.4 Discovering the Dynamics of Experience---Epilepsy Study

174

(6)

5.5 Micro-Phenomenology---Toward Diachronic Models of Experience

180

(4)

5.6 Conclusion: Toward Phenomenologically Informed Dynamical Constraints

184

(4)

Notes

188

(1)

References

188

(5)

6 Conclusion: Toward Methodologically Guided Mutual Constraints

193

(8)

6.1 Constraining Phenomenology

195

(4)

References

199

(2)

Index

201

Marek Pokropski is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland.

Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9781003035367_pe.html

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El. knyga: Mechanisms and Consciousness: Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science [Taylor & Francis e-book]

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