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Phenomenology: A Contemporary Introduction [Kietas viršelis]

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  • Formatas: Hardback, 324 pages, aukštis x plotis: 229x152 mm, weight: 612 g, 1 Tables, black and white; 5 Line drawings, black and white; 5 Illustrations, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy
  • Išleidimo metai: 15-Jun-2020
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367497387
  • ISBN-13: 9780367497385
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Phenomenology: A Contemporary IntroductionDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 324 pages, aukštis x plotis: 229x152 mm, weight: 612 g, 1 Tables, black and white; 5 Line drawings, black and white; 5 Illustrations, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy
  • Išleidimo metai: 15-Jun-2020
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367497387
  • ISBN-13: 9780367497385
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9780367497385.html
Raktažodžiai:
The central task of phenomenology is to investigate the nature of consciousness and its relations to objects of various types. The present book introduces students and other readers to several foundational topics of phenomenological inquiry, and illustrates phenomenologys contemporary relevance. The main topics include consciousness, intentionality, perception, meaning, and knowledge. The book also contains critical assessments of Edmund Husserls phenomenological method. It argues that knowledge is the most fundamental mode of consciousness, and that the central theses constitutive of Husserls "transcendental idealism" are compatible with metaphysical realism regarding the objects of thought, perception, and knowledge.

Helpful tools include introductions that help the reader segue from the previous chapter to the new one, chapter conclusions, and suggested reading lists of primary and some key secondary sources.

Key Features:











Elucidates and engages with contemporary work in analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind





Provides clear prose explanations of the necessary distinctions and arguments required for understanding the subject





Places knowledge at the center of phenomenological inquiry

Recenzijos

"This book is a tour de force its the best phenomenological treatment of the selected topics Ive ever read." Sųren Overgaard, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

"The reception of Husserl's thinking has suffered from the complexity of his ideas and the awkwardness of his jargon. At long last our suffering is at an end. Walter Hopp has created an introduction to phenomenology that is at the same time a pleasure to read and accurate to its subject-matter. Here begins a new era of Husserl scholarship." Barry Smith, University at Buffalo, NY, USA "This book is a tour de force its the best phenomenological treatment of the selected topics Ive ever read." Sųren Overgaard, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

"The reception of Husserl's thinking has suffered from the complexity of his ideas and the awkwardness of his jargon. At long last our suffering is at an end. Walter Hopp has created an introduction to phenomenology that is at the same time a pleasure to read and accurate to its subject-matter. Here begins a new era of Husserl scholarship." Barry Smith, University at Buffalo, NY, USA

"Hopp's book is a terrific study, full of intriguing arguments within a broadly Husserlian approach to phenomenology. I applaud his critical approach to the problems of perception, knowledge, and reality: as Husserl's own results beckon us to extend phenomenology in a context of philosophizing today -- quite as in the spirit of this more than introductory study in phenomenology." David Woodruff Smith, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

List of illustrations
xiii
Acknowledgments xiv
Preface xvi
1 Consciousness
1(17)
1.1 Intentionality and Phenomenality
2(3)
1.2 Transparency
5(1)
1.3 A Dilemma for Phenomenology
6(3)
1.4 Transparency and Intentionalism
9(1)
1.5 Against Transparency
10(5)
1.6 Conclusion
15(3)
2 Consciousness---A Look Inside
18(32)
2.1 Some Discoverable Features of Intentional Experiences
18(16)
2.1.1 Intuitive Character
19(3)
2.1.2 Positing Character
22(2)
2.1.3 Directness
24(5)
2.1.4 Originary Character
29(5)
2.2 Some Further Features of Consciousness
34(13)
2.2.1 The For-Structure of Consciousness
34(10)
2.2.2 The Temporal Structure of Consciousness
44(3)
2.2.3 The Attentional Structure of Consciousness
47(1)
2.3 Conclusion
47(3)
3 Intentionality and Meaning
50(30)
3.1 Some Components of a Linguistic Act
51(3)
3.2 What Meanings Aren't
54(8)
3.2.1 The Meaning of an Utterance is not the Utterance's Object
54(1)
3.2.2 Meanings are not Linguistic Types or Tokens
55(3)
3.2.3 Meanings are not Mental Acts
58(4)
3.3 The Objectivity of Meanings
62(6)
3.4 The Subjectivity of Meanings
68(3)
3.5 Meanings as Intentional Properties
71(2)
3.6 Objections to the Species View
73(4)
3.6.1 Thinking of What Does Not Exist
73(1)
3.6.2 The Situated Character of Intentionality
74(3)
3.7 Conclusion
77(3)
4 The Mental Act
80(19)
4.1 The Intentional Essence of an Act
80(3)
4.2 Quality and Modification-Character
83(4)
4.3 Many-rayed, Compound, and Founded Acts
87(2)
4.4 The Intentional Relation
89(8)
4.4.1 Consciousness and Existence
90(2)
4.4.2 Immanence and Transcendence
92(5)
4.5 Conclusion
97(2)
5 Meaning and Intuition
99(33)
5.1 Cognitive Fulfillment
101(4)
5.2 Authentic Intentionality
105(4)
5.2.1 Epistemic and Semantic Authenticity
106(3)
5.3 The Ideal Connections Among Meanings, Fulfilling Senses, and Objects
109(13)
5.3.1 Categorial Meaning and Intuition
112(2)
5.3.2 Manifolds and Fulfilling Senses
114(4)
5.3.3 Meaning Beyond Possible Originary Intuition
118(4)
5.4 Ideal Verificationism
122(7)
5.4.1 Ideal Verificationism and Realism
126(2)
5.4.2 Yoshimi's Objection
128(1)
5.5 Conclusion
129(3)
6 Perception
132(24)
6.1 Adequate and Inadequate Intuition
135(2)
6.2 Transcendence and Constancy
137(1)
6.3 Transcendence and Horizons
138(4)
6.4 Intuitive Fulfillment
142(1)
6.5 Manifolds and Objects
142(6)
6.6 Why Perception is Direct
148(2)
6.7 Qualia and Separatism
150(4)
6.8 Conclusion
154(2)
7 The Essential Inadequacy of Perception
156(24)
7.1 The Sense Datum Theory
157(2)
7.2 Perspectival Properties
159(1)
7.3 The Perception of Depth
160(2)
7.4 Sensations
162(4)
7.5 Profiles
166(3)
7.6 Explaining the Disagreement
169(3)
7.7 Perception without Immanence
172(3)
7.8 Kinesthetic Sensations and Motor Intentionality
175(3)
7.9 Conclusion
178(2)
8 The Content of Perception
180(30)
8.1 Conceptualism
180(3)
8.2 Against Conceptualism
183(10)
8.2.1 Conceptualism and the Fundamentality of Perception
183(2)
8.2.2 Conceptualism and Intentionality
185(1)
8.2.3 Conceptualism, Perception, and Fulfillment
186(2)
8.2.4 Perception and Empty Horizons
188(2)
8.2.5 Conceptualism and Knowledge
190(3)
8.3 Naive Realism
193(10)
8.3.1 Hallucination
196(4)
8.3.2 Naive Realism and the Inadequacy of Perception
200(3)
8.4 Perceiving Universals
203(4)
8.5 Conclusion
207(3)
9 Knowledge
210(32)
9.1 Phenomenology and the Problem of Skepticism
210(4)
9.2 A Characterization of Knowledge
214(1)
9.3 Fulfillment Revisited
215(2)
9.4 The Principle of All Principles
217(17)
9.4.1 The Scope of the Principle of All Principles
219(1)
9.4.2 The Necessity of the Principle of All Principles
220(1)
9.4.3 The Principle of All Principles Is a Source, not a Ground, of Knowledge
221(6)
9.4.4 The Principle of All Principles and Foundationalism
227(3)
9.4.5 The "Myth of the Given"
230(4)
9.5 Knowledge by Acquaintance
234(3)
9.6 Conclusion
237(5)
10 Phenomenology
242(28)
10.1 The Things Themselves
242(3)
10.2 Transcendental Phenomenology
245(1)
10.3 The Transcendental Insight
246(6)
10.4 The Phenomenological Reduction
252(9)
10.4.1 The Hands-Off Principle
252(3)
10.4.2 The Reduction and Its Results
255(6)
10.5 Two Modest Conceptions of the Reduction
261(7)
10.5.1 The Quotation View
261(3)
10.5.2 The Bracketing View
264(4)
10.6 Conclusion
268(2)
11 Phenomenology and Transcendental Idealism
270(26)
11.1 Phenomenology and the Question of Realism
270(3)
11.2 The Tension in Husserl's Thinking
273(1)
11.3 Realism in the Natural Attitude
274(2)
11.4 Realism in the Phenomenological Attitude
276(7)
11.5 Husserl Against "Realism"
283(5)
11.5.1 Husserl Against Naturalistic Realism
285(3)
11.6 Transcendental Idealism
288(5)
11.7 Conclusion
293(3)
Bibliography 296(22)
Index 318
Walter Hopp is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. He is the author of Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account (2011).