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Phenomenology: A Contemporary Introduction [Minkštas viršelis]

4.12/5 (16 ratings by Goodreads)
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 324 pages, aukštis x plotis: 229x152 mm, weight: 467 g, 1 Tables, black and white; 5 Line drawings, black and white; 5 Illustrations, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy
  • Išleidimo metai: 10-Jun-2020
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367497395
  • ISBN-13: 9780367497392
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Phenomenology: A Contemporary IntroductionDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 324 pages, aukštis x plotis: 229x152 mm, weight: 467 g, 1 Tables, black and white; 5 Line drawings, black and white; 5 Illustrations, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy
  • Išleidimo metai: 10-Jun-2020
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367497395
  • ISBN-13: 9780367497392
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9780367497392.html
Raktažodžiai:
"The central task of phenomenology is to investigate the nature of consciousness and its relations to objects of various types. The present book introduces students and other readers to several foundational topics of phenomenological inquiry, and illustrates phenomenology's contemporary relevance. The main topics include consciousness, intentionality, perception, meaning, and knowledge. The book also contains critical assessments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method. It argues that knowledge is the most fundamental mode of consciousness, and that the central theses constitutive of Husserl's "transcendental idealism" are compatible with metaphysical realism regarding the objects of thought, perception, and knowledge. Helpful tools include introductions that help the reader segue from the previous chapter to the new one, chapter conclusions, and suggested reading lists of primary and some key secondary sources. Key Features: Elucidates and engages with contemporary work in analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind. Provides clear prose explanations of the necessary distinctions and arguments required for understanding the subject. Places knowledge at the center of phenomenological inquiry"--

The central task of phenomenology is to investigate the nature of consciousness and its relations to objects of various types. The present book introduces students and other readers to several foundational topics of phenomenological inquiry, and illustrates phenomenology’s contemporary relevance. The main topics include consciousness, intentionality, perception, meaning, and knowledge. The book also contains critical assessments of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method. It argues that knowledge is the most fundamental mode of consciousness, and that the central theses constitutive of Husserl’s "transcendental idealism" are compatible with metaphysical realism regarding the objects of thought, perception, and knowledge.

Helpful tools include introductions that help the reader segue from the previous chapter to the new one, chapter conclusions, and suggested reading lists of primary and some key secondary sources.

Key Features:

  • Elucidates and engages with contemporary work in analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind

  • Provides clear prose explanations of the necessary distinctions and arguments required for understanding the subject

    • Places knowledge at the center of phenomenological inquiry

    • Recenzijos

    "This book is a tour de force its the best phenomenological treatment of the selected topics Ive ever read." Sųren Overgaard, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

    "The reception of Husserl's thinking has suffered from the complexity of his ideas and the awkwardness of his jargon. At long last our suffering is at an end. Walter Hopp has created an introduction to phenomenology that is at the same time a pleasure to read and accurate to its subject-matter. Here begins a new era of Husserl scholarship." Barry Smith, University at Buffalo, NY, USA "This book is a tour de force its the best phenomenological treatment of the selected topics Ive ever read." Sųren Overgaard, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

    "The reception of Husserl's thinking has suffered from the complexity of his ideas and the awkwardness of his jargon. At long last our suffering is at an end. Walter Hopp has created an introduction to phenomenology that is at the same time a pleasure to read and accurate to its subject-matter. Here begins a new era of Husserl scholarship." Barry Smith, University at Buffalo, NY, USA

    "Hopp's book is a terrific study, full of intriguing arguments within a broadly Husserlian approach to phenomenology. I applaud his critical approach to the problems of perception, knowledge, and reality: as Husserl's own results beckon us to extend phenomenology in a context of philosophizing today -- quite as in the spirit of this more than introductory study in phenomenology." David Woodruff Smith, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

    List of illustrations
    		xiii
    Acknowledgments xiv
    Preface xvi
    1 Consciousness
    		1(17)
    1.1 Intentionality and Phenomenality
    		2(3)
    1.2 Transparency
    		5(1)
    1.3 A Dilemma for Phenomenology
    		6(3)
    1.4 Transparency and Intentionalism
    		9(1)
    1.5 Against Transparency
    		10(5)
    1.6 Conclusion
    		15(3)
    2 Consciousness--A Look Inside
    		18(32)
    2.1 Some Discoverable Features of Intentional Experiences
    		18(16)
    2.1.1 Intuitive Character
    		19(3)
    2.1.2 Positing Character
    		22(2)
    2.1.3 Directness
    		24(5)
    2.1.4 Originary Character
    		29(5)
    2.2 Some Further Features of Consciousness
    		34(13)
    2.2.1 The For-Structure of Consciousness
    		34(10)
    2.2.2 The Temporal Structure of Consciousness
    		44(3)
    2.2.3 The Attentional Structure of Consciousness
    		47(1)
    2.3 Conclusion
    		47(3)
    3 Intentionality and Meaning
    		50(30)
    3.1 Some Components of a Linguistic Act
    		51(3)
    3.2 What Meanings Aren't
    		54(8)
    3.2.1 The Meaning of an Utterance is not the Utterance's Object
    		54(1)
    3.2.2 Meanings are not Linguistic Types or Tokens
    		55(3)
    3.2.3 Meanings are not Mental Acts
    		58(4)
    3.3 The Objectivity of Meanings
    		62(6)
    3.4 The Subjectivity of Meanings
    		68(3)
    3.5 Meanings as Intentional Properties
    		71(2)
    3.6 Objections to the Species View
    		73(4)
    3.6.1 Thinking of What Does Not Exist
    		73(1)
    3.6.2 The Situated Character of Intentionality
    		74(3)
    3.7 Conclusion
    		77(3)
    4 The Mental Act
    		80(19)
    4.1 The Intentional Essence of an Act
    		80(3)
    4.2 Quality and Modification-Character
    		83(4)
    4.3 Many-rayed, Compound, and Founded Acts
    		87(2)
    4.4 The Intentional Relation
    		89(8)
    4.4.1 Consciousness and Existence
    		90(2)
    4.4.2 Immanence and Transcendence
    		92(5)
    4.5 Conclusion
    		97(2)
    5 Meaning and Intuition
    		99(33)
    5.1 Cognitive Fulfillment
    		101(4)
    5.2 Authentic Intentionality
    		105(4)
    5.2.1 Epistemic and Semantic Authenticity
    		106(3)
    5.3 The Ideal Connections Among Meanings, Fulfilling Senses, and Objects
    		109(13)
    5.3.1 Categorial Meaning and Intuition
    		112(2)
    5.3.2 Manifolds and Fulfilling Senses
    		114(4)
    5.3.3 Meaning Beyond Possible Originary Intuition
    		118(4)
    5.4 Ideal Verificationism
    		122(7)
    5.4.1 Ideal Verificationism and Realism
    		126(2)
    5.4.2 Yoshimi's Objection
    		128(1)
    5.5 Conclusion
    		129(3)
    6 Perception
    		132(24)
    6.1 Adequate and Inadequate Intuition
    		135(2)
    6.2 Transcendence and Constancy
    		137(1)
    6.3 Transcendence and Horizons
    		138(4)
    6.4 Intuitive Fulfillment
    		142(1)
    6.5 Manifolds and Objects
    		142(6)
    6.6 Why Perception is Direct
    		148(2)
    6.7 Qualia and Separatism
    		150(4)
    6.8 Conclusion
    		154(2)
    7 The Essential Inadequacy of Perception
    		156(24)
    7.1 The Sense Datum Theory
    		157(2)
    7.2 Perspectival Properties
    		159(1)
    7.3 The Perception of Depth
    		160(2)
    7.4 Sensations
    		162(4)
    7.5 Profiles
    		166(3)
    7.6 Explaining the Disagreement
    		169(3)
    7.7 Perception without Immanence
    		172(3)
    7.8 Kinesthetic Sensations and Motor Intentionality
    		175(3)
    7.9 Conclusion
    		178(2)
    8 The Content of Perception
    		180(30)
    8.1 Conceptualism
    		180(3)
    8.2 Against Conceptualism
    		183(10)
    8.2.1 Conceptualism and the Fundamentality of Perception
    		183(2)
    8.2.2 Conceptualism and Intentionality
    		185(1)
    8.2.3 Conceptualism, Perception, and Fulfillment
    		186(2)
    8.2.4 Perception and Empty Horizons
    		188(2)
    8.2.5 Conceptualism and Knowledge
    		190(3)
    8.3 Naive Realism
    		193(10)
    8.3.1 Hallucination
    		196(4)
    8.3.2 Naive Realism and the Inadequacy of Perception
    		200(3)
    8.4 Perceiving Universals
    		203(4)
    8.5 Conclusion
    		207(3)
    9 Knowledge
    		210(32)
    9.1 Phenomenology and the Problem of Skepticism
    		210(4)
    9.2 A Characterization of Knowledge
    		214(1)
    9.3 Fulfillment Revisited
    		215(2)
    9.4 The Principle of All Principles
    		217(17)
    9.4.1 The Scope of the Principle of All Principles
    		219(1)
    9.4.2 The Necessity of the Principle of All Principles
    		220(1)
    9.4.3 The Principle of All Principles Is a Source, not a Ground, of Knowledge
    		221(6)
    9.4.4 The Principle of All Principles and Foundationalism
    		227(3)
    9.4.5 The "Myth of the Given"
    		230(4)
    9.5 Knowledge by Acquaintance
    		234(3)
    9.6 Conclusion
    		237(5)
    10 Phenomenology
    		242(28)
    10.1 The Things Themselves
    		242(3)
    10.2 Transcendental Phenomenology
    		245(1)
    10.3 The Transcendental Insight
    		246(6)
    10.4 The Phenomenological Reduction
    		252(9)
    10.4.1 The Hands-Off Principle
    		252(3)
    10.4.2 The Reduction and Its Results
    		255(6)
    10.5 Two Modest Conceptions of the Reduction
    		261(7)
    10.5.1 The Quotation View
    		261(3)
    10.5.2 The Bracketing View
    		264(4)
    10.6 Conclusion
    		268(2)
    11 Phenomenology and Transcendental Idealism
    		270(26)
    11.1 Phenomenology and the Question of Realism
    		270(3)
    11.2 The Tension in Husserl's Thinking
    		273(1)
    11.3 Realism in the Natural Attitude
    		274(2)
    11.4 Realism in the Phenomenological Attitude
    		276(7)
    11.5 Husserl Against "Realism"
    		283(5)
    11.5.1 Husserl Against Naturalistic Realism
    		285(3)
    11.6 Transcendental Idealism
    		288(5)
    1.7 Conclusion
    		293(3)
    Bibliography 296(22)
    Index 318
    Walter Hopp is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. He is the author of Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account (2011).