Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

Spandrels of Truth [Kietas viršelis]

(University of Connecticut)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 170 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 222x144x18 mm, weight: 347 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 09-Apr-2009
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199268738
  • ISBN-13: 9780199268733
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 170 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 222x144x18 mm, weight: 347 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 09-Apr-2009
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199268738
  • ISBN-13: 9780199268733
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which "is true" is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes (particularly, the notorious Liar and Curry paradoxes). The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of "true" are limited. In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.

Recenzijos

The account offered is unique among recent treatments of the paradoxes for saving a perfectly transparent truth predicate, whereby x and x is true are fully intersubstitutable. This feature, and its stabilisation within a bivalent framework, give the book considerable specialist interest. but the informality of the treatment, achieved without significant compromise of rigour, provides in addition for a remarkably effective and readable introduction to the contemporary debate about the paradoxes. * Crispin Wright, New York University * ...although paradoxes such as the Liar have provided the main motivation for dialetheism, it is remarkable that previous dialetheic theories do not preserve the minimalist view of truth. Spandrels of Truth is the first dialetheic attempt to do so, and it addresses the main problems (e.g. the conditional) that a dialetheic minimalist must face. It is a very welcome addition to the literature. * Hartry Field, New York University * In this excellent book, Beall defends this combination of dialethism and transparency, drawing out its consequences with clarity and verve. The book also serves as an introduction to transparent theories of truth more generally, by including a valuable discussion of the leading rival: Field's transparent but non-dialethic account. It adds up to an attractive package: if I were a dialethist, I'd be Beall's kind of dialethist! * Robert Williams, University of Leeds * JC Beall concisely presents and defends a simple, modest, dialetheic approach to truth and semantic paradoxes... it does a great job in presenting and defending its ideas... an excellent and readable introduction to the contemporary technical discussions about truth and semantic paradoxes. * Wen-fang Wang, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *

1 The Basic Picture 1
1.1 Ttruth qua constructed device
1
1.2 Exhaustive negation
3
1.3 Spandrels of ttruth
5
1.4 A formal picture
6
1.5 Basic picture: merely 'semantic' gluts
14
Appendix: LPTT non-triviality
18
2 Suitable Conditional 25
2.1 Capture and Release
25
2.2 Curry and a suitable conditional
26
2.3 Curry and Liars
33
2.4 Truth preservation and validity
34
2.5 Validity?
37
Appendix: BXTT non-triviality
42
3 Just True 48
3.1 Incoherent operators
48
3.2 What just true is not
49
3.3 What just true is: just ttruth
51
3.4 Remarks on revenge
52
3.5 Limited notions of 'just true'
57
Appendix: a note on 'just true' in BX
63
4 A Look at the Field 65
4.1 Broad background projects
65
4.2 Kripke: basic paracomplete
67
4.3 Field: advanced paracomplete
79
4.4 Choosing among rivals?
94
4.5 Summary and closing remarks
97
5 Objections and Replies 98
5.1 Dialetheism, in general
98
5.2 Negation, gaps, and unsettledness
101
5.3 Truth, mathematics, and metaphysics
110
5.4 Base-language gluts?
126
5.5 Orthodoxy: Priestly dialetheism
130
A Overlap without Inconsistency? 134
A.1 Philosophical picture: paranormal
134
A.2 An alternative picture: merely instrumental gluts
137
B List of Common Abbreviations 142
References 143
Index 151
Jc Beall is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, a member of the UConn Group in Logic, and an Associate Fellow of Arché, the AHRC Research Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics, and Epistemology. Though having wide philosophical interests, Beall has published mainly in philosophical logic and the philosophy of logic.